Rational dictators and the killing of innocents: Data from Stalin's archives

Paul R. Gregory, Philipp Schröder and Konstantin Sonin

Journal of Comparative Economics, 2011, vol. 39, issue 1, 34-42

Abstract: We posit a rational choice model of dictatorship to explain the tendency of dictators to repress innocent citizens. This model demonstrates that, when the quality of information about regime enemies is low, a rational dictator will knowingly kill and imprison citizens who are not real enemies. We use the formerly secret Stalin archives to test this proposition against the stylized facts of Stalin's three major repressions.

Keywords: Dictatorial; systems; Stalinism; Soviet; State; and; Party; archives; NKVD; OPGU (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Dictators, Repression and the Median Citizen: An “Eliminations Model” of Stalin’s Terror (Data from the NKVD Archives) (2006)
Working Paper: Dictators, Repression and the Median Citizen: An “Eliminations Model” of Stalin’s Terror (Data from the NKVD Archives) (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:39:y:2011:i:1:p:34-42

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