Reinterpreting social pacts: Theory and evidence

Emilio Colombo, Patrizio Tirelli and Jelle Visser

Journal of Comparative Economics, 2014, vol. 42, issue 2, 358-374

Abstract: We investigate the empirical determinants of social pacts over the 1970–2004 period. We adopt a political economy approach, showing that governments are more likely to sign a pact when the cost of a conflict with trade unions is relatively larger. Such a cost depends on macroeconomic variables and on measures of social conflict and union strength. These findings are remarkably stable across sub-periods, in apparent contrast with previous contributions that emphasised differences between first- and second-generation pacts. Our interpretation is that pacts were different across periods because the policy issues changed, but the incentives to seek union consensus did not.

Keywords: Social pacts; Institutions; Macroeconomic outcomes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E63 J50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Reinterpreting social pacts: theory an evidence (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:42:y:2014:i:2:p:358-374

DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2013.05.008

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