Reinterpreting social pacts: theory an evidence

Emilio Colombo, Patrizio Tirelli and Jelle Visser

No 187, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: Economists have largely neglected the analysis of the relevant factors that induce policymakers and trade unions to sign social pacts, despite their clear implications for economic policies and the functioning of labour markets. In this paper we fill this gap. We build a simple theoretical framework that models social pacts as the outcome of a bargaining process, where the probability of observing a pact is essentially determined by politico-economic factors. Then we test the model using a new and original data set that documents the features of social pacts implemented in advanced economies over the last 30 years.

Keywords: Social pacts; institutions macroeconomic outcomes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E63 J50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2010-05, Revised 2010-05
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http://repec.dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper187.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Reinterpreting social pacts: Theory and evidence (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:187

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