Import competition, fast-track authority and U.S. policy toward China
Yi Che () and
Journal of Comparative Economics, 2020, vol. 48, issue 4, 974-996
Has the rise of China influenced U.S. legislation? China’s economic rise in the past 30 years has largely been driven by its exports of labor intensive products. Taking advantage of this supply shock in the United States and cross-district variation in the composition of industries, we investigate the potential role of Chinese imports in U.S. legislators’ decision on granting Fast-Track Authority to the president. Consistent with Conconi et al. (2012), our empirical analyses indicate that in districts with more industries that are exposed to Chinese import competition, legislators are less likely to give up the power to amend international trade agreements. Interestingly, Chinese imports may distort the view of constituents toward China which render legislators in districts subject to large Chinese import competition to take an affirmative position on foreign policy that may hurt China.
Keywords: Import Competition; Fast-track Authority; U.S. Policy toward China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:48:y:2020:i:4:p:974-996
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