Leveraging code enforcement units to reduce crime: A difference-in-difference analysis of a targeted crime prevention intervention
Hunter M. Boehme,
Brandon Tregle,
Marc Olson and
Cannon Fulmer
Journal of Criminal Justice, 2025, vol. 99, issue C
Abstract:
Police agencies are considering innovative, cost-effective strategies to reduce crime, particularly during a police staffing crisis. One potential strategy involves leveraging code enforcement units to abate vacant lots, buildings, and overgrown landscapes. This approach also offers a light-footprint mechanism to reduce crime with minimal contact between police and the public. The present study utilizes a rigorous quasi-experimental design of a targeted code enforcement crime prevention strategy implemented within a large Southeastern United States police agency. Findings from two-way fixed effects difference-in-difference analyses revealed a non-significant impact on shootings and violent crimes. However, there were significant reductions in total property crimes. This study provides promising evidence of a cost-effective low-contact property crime reduction strategy for police agencies. We discuss policy implications and future research directions.
Keywords: Crime prevention; Problem-oriented policing; Code enforcement; Difference-in-difference; Policing; Violent crime; Shootings; Property crime (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jcjust:v:99:y:2025:i:c:s0047235225001217
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2025.102472
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