Free to choose: Promoting conservation by relaxing outdoor watering restrictions

A. Castledine, Klaus Moeltner, Michael Price and S. Stoddard

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2014, vol. 107, issue PA, 324-343

Abstract: Many water utilities use outdoor watering restrictions based on assigned weekly watering days to promote conservation and delay costly capacity expansions. We find that such policies can lead to unintended consequences – customers who adhere to the prescribed schedule use more water than those following a more flexible irrigation pattern. For our application to residential watering in a high-desert environment, this “rigidity penalty” is robust to an exogenous policy change that allowed an additional watering day per week. Our findings contribute to the growing literature on leakage effects of regulatory policies. In our case inefficiencies arise as policies limit the extent to which agents can temporally re-allocate actions.

Keywords: Outdoor watering; Water conservation; Multi-equation system; Bayesian estimation; Posterior simulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C11 C30 Q25 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Working Paper: Free to Choose: Promoting Conservation by Relaxing Outdoor Watering Restrictions (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:107:y:2014:i:pa:p:324-343

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.02.004

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