Agricultural marketing cooperatives with direct selling: A cooperative–non-cooperative game

Maxime Agbo, Damien Rousselière and Julien Salanié

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2015, vol. 109, issue C, 56-71

Abstract: We build a theoretical model to study a market structure with a marketing cooperative and direct selling, in which many farmers are members of an agricultural marketing cooperative. They can sell their production either to the cooperative or on an oligopolistic local market. We show that the decision to sell to the cooperative induces an anti-competitive effect on the direct selling market. The cooperative facilitates collusion on the local market by making farmers softer competitors on that market. Conversely, direct selling may create a “healthy emulation” among farmers, leading to more production benefiting the cooperative.

Keywords: Marketing cooperative; Direct selling; Local market; Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L11 Q13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Agricultural marketing cooperatives with direct selling: A cooperative non cooperative game (2014)
Working Paper: Agricultural marketing cooperatives with direct selling: A cooperative–non-cooperative game (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:109:y:2015:i:c:p:56-71

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.11.003

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