Better feared than loved: Reputations and the motives for conflict

Iain Long

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2015, vol. 114, issue C, 46-61

Abstract: Throughout history, victory in conflict has created fearsome reputations. Victory thus ensures greater allegiance of the wider population, increasing the victor's rents at the expense of their enemy. Such reputational concerns create two motives for conflict. When only the outcome is informative, the less feared party may attack to show that they are tougher than expected. If the fact that conflict occurred at all also conveys information, the more feared party may attack. If they do not, the population view peace as a sign of weakness and switch loyalties anyway. In this case, conflict arises to save face.

Keywords: Conflict; Reputations; Information structures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D74 D83 F51 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Better Feared than Loved: Reputations and the Motives for Conflict (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:114:y:2015:i:c:p:46-61

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.03.016

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