It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games

David G. Rand, Drew Fudenberg and Anna Dreber

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2015, vol. 116, issue C, 481-499

Abstract: We examine cooperation in repeated interactions where intended actions are implemented with noise but intentions are perfectly observable. Observable intentions lead to more cooperation compared to control games where intentions are unobserved, allowing subjects to reach similar cooperation levels as in games without noise. Most subjects condition exclusively on intentions, and use simpler, lower-memory strategies compared to games where intentions are unobservable. When the returns to cooperation are high, some subjects are tolerant, using good outcomes to forgive attempted defections; when the returns to cooperation are low, some subjects are punitive, using bad outcomes to punish accidental defections.

Keywords: Cooperation; Prisoner's dilemma; Repeated games; Intentions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 D00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:116:y:2015:i:c:p:481-499

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.013

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