Inequality, social sanctions and cooperation within South African fishing communities

Martine Visser and J. Burns

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2015, vol. 118, issue C, 95-109

Abstract: We explore the effect of income inequality and social attitudes on cooperation and sanctioning in nine South African fishing communities, where allocation of fishing rights via quota and permits have been unequal and controversial. We use a linear public goods experiment design with heterogeneous endowments and peer sanctioning. In the Punishment treatment, aggregate contributions towards the public good are significantly higher amongst unequal groups, with low endowment players contributing the greatest endowment share. Sanctioning is significantly lower in unequal groups but demand for punishment is similar, irrespective of differences in relative costs. Free-riding drives punishment, but retaliation is another important motivator (specifically in unequal groups). In equal groups, antisocial punishment of cooperators is more common. The effect of real wealth and inequality on contributions and punishment is less salient, possibly due to real wealth not being discernible in the experimental context. Interestingly, social attitudes are important in explaining sanctioning behavior, indicating that distrust in formal institutions, and specifically in the top-down quota allocation process, may have a significant impact on behavioral outcomes and the effectiveness of community sanctioning mechanisms.

Keywords: Inequality; Cooperation; Punishment; Public; Goods; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D63 H41 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268115000840
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:118:y:2015:i:c:p:95-109

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.03.009

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().