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Information for sale in the European Union

Marianna Belloc ()

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2015, vol. 120, issue C, 130-144

Abstract: This paper empirically explores the role of informational lobbying in shaping the EU trade policy. To this purpose, we construct an original dataset by collecting information on the participation of national and international organizations in the European Commission consultations on trade issues and by merging it with newly released data on non-tariff measures aggregated at the tariff-line level between 1999 and 2007. Our results suggest that European lobbies exert a major influence on policy-makers. Drawing upon the panel structure of the dataset, we find that participation in consultation meetings increases the probability of a protectionist policy, even after controlling for product fixed effects and a number of control variables. Moreover, actual attendance turns out to be more effective than simple registration and organizations representing more than one industrial category are more likely to obtain protection than single-sector organizations. These findings are interpreted in light of a political economy model of lobbying with (possibly endogenous) costs.

Keywords: Informational lobbying; Trade policy; European Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D80 F13 F14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:120:y:2015:i:c:p:130-144

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.09.019

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