Do students behave like real taxpayers in the lab? Evidence from a real effort tax compliance experiment

Lawrence Choo (), Miguel Fonseca and Gareth Myles ()

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2016, vol. 124, issue C, 102-114

Abstract: We report on data from a real-effort tax compliance experiment using three subject pools: students, who do not pay income tax; company employees, whose income is reported by their employer; and self-employed taxpayers, who are responsible for filing and payment. While compliance behavior is unaffected by changes in the level of, or information about the audit probability, higher fines increase compliance. We find subject pool differences: self-assessed taxpayers are the most compliant, while students are the least compliant. Through a simple framing manipulation, we show that such differences are driven by norms of compliance from outside the lab.

Keywords: Tax compliance; Real effort; Field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:124:y:2016:i:c:p:102-114

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.09.015

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