Cognitive load and strategic sophistication

Sarah Allred, Sean Duffy and John Smith

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2016, vol. 125, issue C, 162-178

Abstract: We study the relationship between the cognitive load manipulation and strategic sophistication. The cognitive load manipulation is designed to reduce the subject's cognitive resources that are available for deliberation on a choice. In our experiment, subjects are placed under a high cognitive load (given a difficult number to remember) or a low cognitive load (given a number that is not difficult to remember). Subsequently, the subjects play a one-shot game then they are asked to recall the number. This procedure is repeated for various games. We find that the relationship between cognitive load and strategic sophistication is not persistent across classes of games. This lack of persistence is consistent with recent findings in the literature. We also find that the relationship between cognitive load and actions is different from the relationship between cognitive load and beliefs. This suggests that actions and beliefs may not be as closely related as standard game theory would predict.

Keywords: Bounded rationality; Experimental economics; Working memory load; Cognition; Beauty contest; Rational inattention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268116000366
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Cognitive load and strategic sophistication (2014)
Working Paper: Cognitive Load and Strategic Sophistication (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:125:y:2016:i:c:p:162-178

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.02.006

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().