Communication of soft information: Reputation and imperfect enforcement of reporting quality

Jay Choi, Eirik Kristiansen and Jae Nahm

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2017, vol. 136, issue C, 91-106

Abstract: Entrepreneurs report unverifiable soft information to investors. The credibility of soft information depends on the entrepreneur's reputation concern. In equilibrium, high-talent entrepreneurs, who are better at developing profitable projects in the future and therefore have stronger reputation concerns, signal their talents by producing honest reports on current projects. We show how probabilistic third-party monitoring of reporting quality changes some firms’ reporting strategies, which again spill over to the financing costs of firms not directly affected by improved monitoring. In some cases, improved monitoring of reporting quality can reduce firms’ reputation concerns and result in less efficient communication of information.

Keywords: Cheap talk; Investments; Credibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 L14 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:136:y:2017:i:c:p:91-106

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.02.002

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