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Stochastic asymmetric Blotto games: An experimental study

John Duffy () and Alexander Matros

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2017, vol. 139, issue C, 88-105

Abstract: We consider a model where two players compete for n items having different common values in a Blotto game. Players must decide how to allocate their common budgets across all n items. The winner of each item is determined stochastically using a lottery mechanism which yields a unique equilibrium in pure strategies. We analyze behavior under two competing payoff objectives found in the Blotto games literature that have not been previously compared: (i) players aim to maximize their total expected payoff and (ii) players maximize the probability of winning a majority value of all n items. We report results from an experiment where subjects face both payoff objectives and we find support for the differing theoretical predictions.

Keywords: Colonel Blotto game; Contests; Resourceallocation; Lotteries; Electoral college; Game theory; Political theory; Experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C92 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:139:y:2017:i:c:p:88-105