Stable sets for exchange economies with interdependent preferences

Maria Graziano, Claudia Meo and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2017, vol. 140, issue C, 267-286

Abstract: We introduce the notion of stable sets with externalities and prove its existence. Stable sets provide a successful alternative to core notions of externalities (i.e., α-core, β-core and strong Nash equilibrium), which are typically empty. However, the stable sets do exist in situations where the above core notions are empty.

Keywords: Stable sets; Interdependent preferences; Core; Types of agents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D51 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Working Paper: Stable Sets for Exchange Economies with Interdependent Preferences (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:140:y:2017:i:c:p:267-286

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.017

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