Thomas Jeitschko () and
Chilei Lau ()
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2017, vol. 141, issue C, 122-134
This paper considers “soft debt” as a social convention that facilitates long-term reciprocal relationships. A player is said to follow a soft debt strategy if his decisions depend on the entire history with his counterpart only through their accrued soft debt balance. Under discrete benefits, there exist equilibria in which the players keep reciprocating as long as the debt balance does not exceed a certain limit.
Keywords: Social interactions; Reciprocity; Soft debt; Soft transaction; Favor-trading (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:141:y:2017:i:c:p:122-134
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.
More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().