Coordination with endogenous groups

Roy Chen

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2017, vol. 141, issue C, 177-187

Abstract: The endogenous choice of groups can have an important effect on coordination behavior, but it is an underexplored area of research. In this study, I examine how endogenous group choice affects coordination in a laboratory setting using the minimum-effort game. Most studies on coordination use randomly assigned groups, with some showing that successful coordination can be achieved if the subjects have some social interaction. This study shows that an alternative strategy to improving coordination behavior and equilibrium play is to allow subjects some choice over their group membership.

Keywords: Experiment; Endogenous groups; Coordination; Minimum-effort game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:141:y:2017:i:c:p:177-187

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.010

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