Complicity without connection or communication
Abigail Barr and
Georgia Michailidou
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2017, vol. 142, issue C, 1-10
Abstract:
We use a novel laboratory experiment involving a die rolling task embedded within a coordination game to investigate whether complicity can emerge when decision-making is simultaneous, the potential accomplices are strangers and neither communication nor signaling is possible. Then, by comparing the behavior observed in this original game to that in a variant in which die-roll reporting players are paired with passive players instead of other die-roll reporters, while everything else is held constant, we isolate the effect of having a potential accomplice on the likelihood of an individual acting immorally. We find that complicity can emerge between strangers in the absence of opportunities to communicate or signal and that having a potential accomplice increases the likelihood of an individual acting immorally.
Keywords: Complicity; Lying; Die under the cup task (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 C91 C92 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)
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Working Paper: Complicity without Connection or Communication (2016) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:142:y:2017:i:c:p:1-10
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.013
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