“Read my lips! (but only if I was elected)!” Experimental evidence on the effects of electoral competition on promises, shirking and trust

Gari Walkowitz and Arne R. Weiss

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2017, vol. 142, issue C, 348-367

Abstract: We experimentally test whether electoral competition reduces shirking behavior by office-holders and increases citizens’ trust. Using a novel multi-person investment game with voting, we indeed find that elected office-holders shirk less (i.e., they back-transfer more to citizens relative to investments) than randomly appointed office-holders. Surprisingly, this effect is not driven by electoral competition inflating office-holders’ promises. Instead, elected office-holders feel more committed to their promises than their randomly appointed counterparts. Elections initially also increase citizens’ trust because voters select candidates with the “right” kind of promises: neither low nor non-credibly high. However, over the course of the entire experiment, we find no evidence that electoral competition increases citizens’ trust.

Keywords: Elections; Promises; Shirking; Trust game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C91 D02 D03 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:142:y:2017:i:c:p:348-367

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.06.012

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