Payment scheme self-selection in the credence goods market: An experimental study

Hernan Bejarano, Ellen Green and Stephen Rassenti

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2017, vol. 142, issue C, 396-403

Abstract: Given heterogeneity in expert behavior across payment schemes in credence goods markets, it is important to understand the consequences of payment scheme selection on market outcomes. To study the effect that expert payment selection has on customer well-being, we recruited subjects to participate in a real-effort credence goods laboratory game. Experts were either randomly assigned or faced with the choice of three payment schemes: fee-for-service, salary, and capitation. We found that when experts selected fee-for-service payment customers experience significantly worse outcomes than when experts were randomly assigned to fee-for-service. In contrast, whether experts selected or were randomly assigned to salary payment, customer outcomes did not change.

Keywords: Credence goods; Self-selection; Fee-for-service; Capitation; Payment; Sorting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268117302287
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Payment Scheme Self-Selection in the Credence Goods Market: An Experimental Study (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:142:y:2017:i:c:p:396-403

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.08.004

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().