How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm
Nejat Anbarci () and
Nick Feltovich ()
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2018, vol. 145, issue C, 320-334
A recurring puzzle in bargaining experiments is that individuals under-exploit their bargaining position, compared to theoretical predictions. We conduct an experiment using two institutions: Nash demand game (NDG) and unstructured bargaining game (UBG). Unlike most previous experiments, disagreement payoffs are earned rather than assigned, and about one-fourth of the time, one bargainer's disagreement payoff is more than half the cake size (“dominant bargaining power”), so that equal splits are not individually rational.
Keywords: Nash demand game; Unstructured bargaining; Real effort; Dominant bargaining power; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C72 D81 C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Working Paper: How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:145:y:2018:i:c:p:320-334
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Neilson, William Stuart
More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().