EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Electoral competition with third party entry in the lab

Nikolas Tsakas () and Dimitrios Xefteris

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2018, vol. 148, issue C, 121-134

Abstract: Electoral competition between two vote-share maximizing candidates in the context of the unidimensional spatial model leads to platform convergence: both candidates end up proposing the ideal policy of the median voter (Downs, 1957). Palfrey (1984) famously argued that if third candidate entry is expected after the two main candidates choose their platforms, the unique equilibrium is such that the two main candidates locate substantially far from each other. By conducting a laboratory experiment, we put this popular idea to test, for the first time. We allow entry to take place with four different probabilities and find that, indeed, the degree of polarization of the two main candidates’ platforms increases as third candidate entry becomes more likely to occur, providing strong evidence in support of Palfrey (1984)’s formal results and underlying intuition.

Keywords: Electoral competition; Entry; Third party; Spatial model; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016726811830043X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Electoral Competition with Third Party Entry in the Lab (2017) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:148:y:2018:i:c:p:121-134

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Neilson, William Stuart

More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

 
Page updated 2019-04-14
Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:148:y:2018:i:c:p:121-134