A Model Of rivalries with endogenous prize and strength

Zijun Luo and Xin Xie

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2018, vol. 152, issue C, 215-223

Abstract: This paper extends Beviá and Corchón (2013) to a model with both endogenous contestable prize and endogenous relative strength. Such a setting is ideal for the study of intra-organizational rivalries, commonly observed in family, sports, promotion, and duopoly. We find that when the game starts with asymmetric players, the weaker player exerts more effort than the stronger player. As a result, the weaker player partially overcomes the disadvantage of being weak. In this setting, neither domino nor avalanche effect exists.

Keywords: Contest; Endogenous prize; Endogenous strength; Domino effect; Avalanche effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:152:y:2018:i:c:p:215-223

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.013

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