“Fatal Attraction” and Level-k thinking in games with Non-neutral frames
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2018, vol. 156, issue C, 219-224
Traditional game theory assumes that if framing does not affect a game’s payoffs, it will not influence behavior. However, Rubinstein and Tversky (1993), Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller (1996), and Rubinstein (1999) reported experiments eliciting initial responses to hide-and-seek and other types of game, in which subjects’ behavior responded systematically to non-neutral framing via decision labelings. Crawford and Iriberri (2007ab) proposed a level-k explanation of Rubinstein et al.’s results for hide-and-seek games. Heap, Rojo-Arjona, and Sugden’s (2014) criticized Crawford and Iriberri’s model on grounds of portability. This paper clarifies Heap et al.’s interpretation of their results and responds to their criticisms, suggesting a way forward.
Keywords: Behavioral game theory; Experimental game theory; Strategic thinking; Level-k models; Coordination; Salience (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:156:y:2018:i:c:p:219-224
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