Legislative restraints in corporate bailout design

Mark Gradstein and Michael Kaganovich ()

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2019, vol. 158, issue C, 337-350

Abstract: The aftermath of the recent economic crisis saw the largest U.S. government bailout of corporate entities ever. While the bailout was carried out with the explicit goal of restoring stability, it aroused much controversy and public criticism based on moral hazard concerns as well as the exorbitant cost to the taxpayer. This paper examines the bailout design on behalf of an imperfectly informed legislature aimed at shaping the incentives of a policymaker to whom bailout decisions are delegated. We show that important elements of the more moral hazard-proof design entail various legislative procedural hurdles, which effectively make the bailouts dependent on supermajority support.

Keywords: Political economy; Corporate bailouts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E6 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Legislative Restraint in Corporate Bailout Design (2018)
Working Paper: Legislative Restraint in Corporate Bailout Design (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:158:y:2019:i:c:p:337-350

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.003

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