Endogenous sanctioning institutions and migration patterns: Experimental evidence

Ramon Cobo-Reyes, Gabriel Katz and Simone Meraglia

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2019, vol. 158, issue C, 575-606

Abstract: We experimentally analyze the effect of the endogenous choice of sanctioning institutions on cooperation and migration patterns. Subjects are assigned to one of two groups, are endowed with group-specific preferences, and play a public goods game. We compare an environment in which subjects can move between groups and vote on whether to implement sanctions, to one in which only one group is exogenously endowed with sanctions. We find that the possibility of voting leads to a more efficient partition of subjects across groups, higher payoffs, lower inequality, and lower migration rates. Over time, subjects tend to vote for institutions.

Keywords: Formal sanctions; Cooperation; Migration; Voting; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C91 C92 D72 H41 H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268118303597
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Endogenous Sanctioning Institutions and Migration Patterns: Experimental Evidence (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:158:y:2019:i:c:p:575-606

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.029

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().