Failure of the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism in inexperienced subjects: New tests of the game form misconception hypothesis
Pascal Courty (),
Maurice Doyon and
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2019, vol. 159, issue C, 235-253
Cason and Plott (2014, hereafter CP) conclude that sub-optimal behavior in the (second price) Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism (BDM) is consistent with the hypothesis that a significant proportion of subjects misconceive the BDM as a first price auction. We broadly replicate CP’s results, formalize a game form recognition theory for the analysis of treatment effects, and explore the robustness of CP’s conclusions across four treatments. We conclude that the pattern of misconception that explains the BDM data cannot simultaneously explain observed choices in closely related treatments.
Keywords: Experiment; Game form recognition; Game form misconception; Mistake; Becker–DeGroot–Marschak; Preference elicitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C8 C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Working Paper: Failure of the Becker-Degroot-Marschak Mechanism in Inexperienced Subjects: New Tests of the Game Form Misconception Hypothesis (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:159:y:2019:i:c:p:235-253
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.
More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Haili He ().