Interactive Ellsberg tasks: An experiment

Adam Dominiak and Peter Duersch
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Peter Dürsch

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2019, vol. 161, issue C, 145-157

Abstract: In his Ph.D.-thesis, Ellsberg formulated strong conditions under which his hypothetical tests of SEU theory have to take place – there should be no strategic interaction. Yet, in reality, situations with unknown probabilities often feature strategic interests of others, who may influence the unknown probabilities. Will decision makers see such situations as interactive or not? We construct experimental treatments where subjects make decisions under ambiguity, while also facing strategic motives of others. Payoffs form coordination or zero-sum games. At least a quarter of subjects view the situation as interactive; others behave in line with the predictions of ambiguity models.

Keywords: Ambiguity; Ellsberg task; Ambiguity aversion; Ellsberg conditions; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:161:y:2019:i:c:p:145-157

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.005

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