It pays to be a man: Rewards for leaders in a coordination game

Philip Grossman, Catherine Eckel, Mana Komai and Wei Zhan

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2019, vol. 161, issue C, 197-215

Abstract: We address gender differences in leader effectiveness and followers’ perceptions of leaders’ effectiveness. Our experimental design removes gender-linked factors that might affect leadership success, such as risk-taking and competitiveness. We employ a repeated weakest-link coordination game. Subjects first complete 10 periods without a leader, and then complete 10 additional periods after a leader is introduced. The leader's intervention consists of a short, semi-scripted speech advising followers on how to maximize earnings. Followers then choose a costly bonus for the leader. The leader's gender is the only variable that changes across sessions. Our results suggest that women are assessed less positively and rewarded less generously than equally effective men. Even women who are as competitive and risk loving as men may find it difficult to attain positions and succeed at the upper levels of business and government. While our findings may not fully explain why women of intelligence, character, and training are underrepresented in higher echelons of the society, they do shed light on a piece of this puzzle.

Keywords: Leadership; Gender; Coordination game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 J16 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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Related works:
Working Paper: It Pays to Be a Man: Rewards for Leaders in a Coordination Game (2017)
Working Paper: It Pays to Be a Man: Rewards for Leaders in a Coordination Game (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:161:y:2019:i:c:p:197-215

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.04.002

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