Strategic feedback in teams: Theory and experimental evidence
Mert Gümren and
Levent Koçkesen ()
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2019, vol. 162, issue C, 1-23
We theoretically and experimentally analyze public and private feedback in teams that are characterized by different performance technologies. We consider a setting where the principal has some performance relevant private information and can either report this information truthfully or strategically withhold feedback. We find that if team performance is determined by the best performer (the “best-shot technology”), then both public and private feedback are better than no feedback unless the team is composed of all low performers, in which case no feedback is best. If, on the other hand, team performance is determined by the worst performer (the weakest-link technology), then no feedback is the best regime unless the team is composed of all high performers, in which case public or private feedback is better. Our results have implications for feedback policies in teams, organizations, and the workplace.
Keywords: Lab experiments; Feedback; Teams; Strategic communication; Disclosure games; Multiple audiences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D23 D82 D83 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Strategic Feedback in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:162:y:2019:i:c:p:1-23
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