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Path of intertemporal cooperation and limits to turn-taking behavior

Yohanes Riyanto () and Nilanjan Roy

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2019, vol. 165, issue C, 21-36

Abstract: Cooperation can take several forms when a group of people interact repeatedly over time. Turn-taking is one such form of intertemporal cooperation that is observed in various daily activities, but at the same time, remains under-studied in the economics literature. We report results from experiments designed to investigate the path of intertemporal cooperation in three-person finitely repeated public good games without communication. Each round, only a subset of individuals is needed to contribute in order to generate a public benefit to all group members. Incidence of perfect turn-taking is limited to settings where the costs are homogeneous. When the perfect turn-taking path is at odds with efficiency, players seldom engage in taking turns. Private information about costs changes the timing of individual decisions within each round. A timed contribution protocol limits the frequency of miscoordinated outcomes every round.

Keywords: Public good provision; Intertemporal cooperation; Turn-taking; Timed contribution; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.07.003

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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

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