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Kinship, fractionalization and corruption

Mahsa Akbari (), Duman Bahrami-Rad () and Erik Kimbrough

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2019, vol. 166, issue C, 493-528

Abstract: We examine the roots of variation in corruption across societies, and we argue that marriage practices and family structure are an important, overlooked determinant of corruption. By shaping patterns of relatedness and interaction, marriage practices influence the relative returns to norms of nepotism/favoritism versus norms of impartial cooperation. In-marriage (e.g. consanguineous marriage) generates fractionalization because it yields relatively closed groups of related individuals and thereby encourages favoritism and corruption. Out-marriage creates a relatively open society with increased interaction between non-relatives and strangers, thereby encouraging impartiality. We report a robust association between in-marriage practices and corruption both across countries and within countries. Instrumental variables estimates exploiting historical variation in preferred marriage practices and in exposure to the Catholic Church’s family policies provide evidence that the relationship could be causal.

Keywords: Corruption; Fractionalization; Institutions; Mating patterns; Consanguinity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 J1 K4 N3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Working Paper: Kinship, Fractionalization and Corruption (2017) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:166:y:2019:i:c:p:493-528

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.07.015

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