Prior interaction, identity, and cooperation in the Inter-group Prisoner's Dilemma
Timothy Cason (),
Sau-Him Paul Lau and
Vai-Lam Mui ()
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2019, vol. 166, issue C, 613-629
This paper studies theoretically and experimentally how success in prior interaction affects cooperation in the one-shot Inter-group Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD). We develop a model of the IPD that incorporates group-contingent social preferences and bounded rationality to derive conditions under which an increase in pro-social concerns for an out-group will increase cooperation. We then report an experiment that shows the cooperation rate increases from 8 percent in a baseline one-shot IPD to 42 percent when the IPD is preceded by a coordination game played by members of the two groups. A post-experiment survey and chat coding results using a natural language classification game both show that successful prior interaction increases individuals’ concerns for their out-group.
Keywords: Prior Interaction; Identity; Inter-group Prisoner's Dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Prior Interaction, Identity and Coorperation in the Inter-Group Prisoner's Dilemma (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:166:y:2019:i:c:p:613-629
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