Rent extraction and prosocial behavior
Tobias Cagala (),
Ulrich Glogowsky,
Veronika Grimm,
Johannes Rincke and
Amanda Tuset-Cueva
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2019, vol. 166, issue C, 709-723
Abstract:
We present controlled experimental evidence on how rent extraction by an administrator affects giving to non-profit associations. Holding the price of giving constant, we compare contributions between two conditions: a rent extraction condition, in which an administrator can expropriate a part of the contributions and a control condition without rent extraction. We find that rent extraction strongly reduces average contributions. Studying the channels through which this effect operates, we demonstrate that rent extraction has situational spillovers, suggesting that it undermines the contributors’ general preference for giving. In contrast, we do not find evidence for negative reciprocity towards the administrator.
Keywords: Rent extraction; Donations; Prosocial behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D03 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Rent Extraction and Prosocial Behavior (2019) 
Working Paper: Rent extraction and prosocial behavior (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:166:y:2019:i:c:p:709-723
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.008
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