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Intermediation and discrimination in an investment game: An experimental study

François Cochard, Alexandre Flage and Emmanuel Peterle ()

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2019, vol. 168, issue C, 196-208

Abstract: Using a three-players’ variant of the investment game with different group identity, we investigate how participants who take decisions on behalf of other behave differently than the party directly involved in a discriminatory context. We provide evidence that pure intermediaries (individuals who make decision on behalf of “owners” and who do not risk their own resources) are more prone to discrimination than “owners” (players who make decisions for themselves). The cause of the discrimination we observe is not hostility toward out-group members but is mainly triggered by preferences for in-group members. It seems that because of their position, intermediaries can express their preferences for in-group members more easily than the owners, although they feel responsible for the resources with which they play. Moreover, our data suggest that owners are more prone to statistical considerations than intermediaries. Finally, we observe a gender effect among intermediaries: women invest significantly less than men.

Keywords: Trust game; Intermediation; Discrimination; Social identity; Responsibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 J15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.10.007

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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

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