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Does increased teacher accountability decrease leniency in grading?

Patrick Puhani and Philip Yang

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020, vol. 171, issue C, 333-341

Abstract: Because accountability may improve the comparability that is compromised by lenient grading, we compare exit exam outcomes in the same schools before and after a policy change that increased teacher accountability by anchoring grading scales through centralization. In particular, using a large administrative dataset of 364,445 exit exam outcomes for 72,889 students, we find that centralization increased inequality in scoring between the higher and lower performing schools by about 25%. In addition, the reform improved relative scoring outcomes for schools with larger shares of male students and lowered relative scoring outcomes for schools with a higher share of minority students.

Keywords: Subjective performance evaluation; Rating standards; Policy reform; Transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H83 I20 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Working Paper: Does Increased Teacher Accountability Decrease Leniency in Grading? (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Does Increased Teacher Accountability Decrease Leniency in Grading? (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Does Increased Teacher Accountability Decrease Leniency in Grading? (2019) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:171:y:2020:i:c:p:333-341

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.017

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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

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