The isomorphism hypothesis: The prisoner's dilemma as intertemporal allocation, and vice versa

Elias Khalil ()

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020, vol. 176, issue C, 735-746

Abstract: Economists model the choice of the current self in intertemporal allocation as the outcome of identity: the current and future selves belong to the same decision maker by the sheer fact they reside in the same “biological skin” defined by biological identity. The economists should be consistent and likewise model the choice of each player in the prisoner's dilemma or, generally, the social dilemma as the outcome of identity: the selves of the players belong to the same decision maker by the sheer fact they reside in the same “social skin” defined by social identity. If the economists consider cooperation rather than defection to be the rational strategy of the current self in intertemporal allocations, they should be consistent and consider cooperation rather than defection to be the rational strategy of each player in social dilemmas. Symmetrically, if the economists judge defection rather than cooperation to be the rational strategy in social dilemmas, it behooves them to also judge defection rather than cooperation to be the rational strategy in intertemporal allocations.

Keywords: Cooperation; Defection; Altruism; Care; Grant (charity); Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 A13 B4 D03 D63 D71 D91 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:176:y:2020:i:c:p:735-746

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.10.020

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