Vying for dominance: An experiment in dynamic network formation

Nathaniel Neligh

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020, vol. 178, issue C, 719-739

Abstract: This paper investigates how the timing of entry into a network can be a crucial determinant of a node’s eventual centrality. In a lab experiment we test a model of strategic network growth where theory predicts that agents entering the network at specific times will make more connections than is myopically optimal in hopes of later receiving additional connections from newer nodes. We find that players do exhibit this “vying for dominance” behavior but systematically vie earlier than is predicted. Small behavioral deviations in the late game can substantially impact the incentives of earlier player.

Keywords: Experiment; Network formation; Networks; Strategic behavior; Foresight; Risk aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:178:y:2020:i:c:p:719-739

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.009

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