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Adam Smith on reputation, commutative justice, and defamation laws

Mark J. Bonica and Daniel B. Klein

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2021, vol. 184, issue C, 788-803

Abstract: We interpret Adam Smith on reputation, commutative justice, and defamation laws. We address two major questions. The first question concerns whether Smith thought that “one's own” as covered by commutative justice included one's reputation. Several passages point to the affirmative. But reputation is left out of Smith's “most sacred laws” description of commutative justice. Most importantly, so much of reputation—e.g., “Steve's work stinks”—does not fit Smith's description of commutative justice's rules (precise and accurate). Our reading makes use of older terminology from Pufendorf, Carmichael, and Hutcheson distinguishing “simple” and “intensive” reputation, and suggests that the “reputation” that sometimes appears in Smith's characterizations of “one's own” is of a simple variety (“Steve steals horses”) that potentially incites invasion of commutative justice's three staples—person, property, promises due. On that reading the “reputation” that comes under commutative justice, though not a staple, belongs to the penumbra around the three staples, just as incitement and endangerment belong to that penumbra. We also recruit Hume, who nowhere even hinted at reputation being a constituent of commutative justice.

Keywords: Adam Smith; Reputation; Commutative justice; Defamation; Libel; Slander; Perfect rights; Natural jurisprudence; Esotericism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 B12 K11 K15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:184:y:2021:i:c:p:788-803

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.028

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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

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