Cold play: Learning across bimatrix games

Terje Lensberg and Klaus Schenk-Hoppé

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2021, vol. 185, issue C, 419-441

Abstract: We study one-shot play in the set of all bimatrix games by a large population of agents. The agents never see the same game twice, but they can learn ‘across games’ by developing solution concepts that tell them how to play new games. Each agent’s individual solution concept is represented by a computer program, and natural selection is applied to derive a stochastically stable solution concept. Our aim is to develop a theory predicting how experienced agents would play in one-shot games. To use the theory, visit https://gplab.nhh.no/gamesolver.php.

Keywords: One-shot games; Solution concepts; Genetic programming; Evolutionary stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C73 C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:185:y:2021:i:c:p:419-441

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.02.027

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