Local institutions and public school spending under restricted suffrage: The case of post-unitary Italy

Riccardo Marchingiglio

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2021, vol. 188, issue C, 1351-1373

Abstract: This paper studies the impact of legislative size on public spending on education, in a context of restricted suffrage. In 1860s Italy, male teachers were pivotal voters and were directly hired and fired by the local council. As a consequence, local legislators gained large political payoffs from public spending on education. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that townships that were quasi-randomly assigned a larger council spent more on primary education by 6% of a standard deviation per additional councilman. Consistent with a pork-barrel mechanism, the legislative size effect on spending is driven by a surge in the appointment of male teachers, while female teachers, ineligible to vote, were not affected by legislative size. Higher school spending is associated with higher public education supply and a larger student population.

Keywords: Public education; Public spending; Local institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:188:y:2021:i:c:p:1351-1373

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.004

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