Agency breadth and political influence

Zachary Breig and Mitch Downey

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2021, vol. 188, issue C, 253-268

Abstract: We study, theoretically and empirically, legislative influence over executive agencies, focusing on the breadth of agency responsibilities. We model interest groups, the legislature, and agencies. Politicians exert costly effort to influence agencies in exchange for interest groups’ campaign contributions. Effort, however, can only be imperfectly targeted. When effort is spent on behalf of one group, some spills over to benefit other interest groups. This creates externalities of influence that are larger in broad agencies, deterring legislative influence. Empirically, we develop a novel lobbying-based measure of breadth and combine it with survey data on influence in 70 US federal agencies. Broad agencies report less influence, and we rule out several alternative explanations. These results are important for understanding how to insulate divisive tasks from political influence.

Keywords: Agency design; Money in politics; Regulatory politics; Regulatory capture; Special interest groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H11 K20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:188:y:2021:i:c:p:253-268

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.05.009

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