Naïve imitation and partial cooperation in a local public goods model

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ronald Peeters, Anastas Tenev and Frank Thuijsman

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2021, vol. 191, issue C, 162-185

Abstract: In a local interaction model agents play bilateral prisoners’ dilemmas with their immediate neighbors and have three possible strategies: altruistic, egoistic, and partial cooperation. After each period the agents adopt the strategy with the highest average payoff in their observed local neighborhood. There does not exist an absorbing state in which the partially cooperative strategy coexists with any of the other strategies. The partially cooperative strategy limits the diffusion of altruistic behavior in the population. Although clustering of altruists is beneficial for sustaining altruism, relatively big groups of altruists at the onset enable the spread of the partially cooperative strategy.

Keywords: Altruism; Public goods; Imitation; Local interaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C70 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Naïve imitation and partial cooperation in a local public goods model (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:191:y:2021:i:c:p:162-185

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.07.025

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