Are gender quotas on candidates bound to be ineffective?

Quentin Lippmann

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2021, vol. 191, issue C, 661-678

Abstract: This article studies the short- and long-term effectiveness of gender quotas applied to candidates in elections based on single-member districts. I exploit the introduction of gender quotas in the French parliamentary elections in 1997 and 2002. Using election data from 1978 to 2017 and a difference-in-differences strategy, I show that the main political parties all reacted by nominating women in less winnable districts in the short term but these strategies gradually disappear for the left-wing party while they persist up to 15 years later for the right-wing party. I argue that these nomination patterns are partly explained by the persistence of incumbents and the inexperience of new female candidates as well as different compliance levels by the main parties.

Keywords: Gender; Elections; Public policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 J16 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:191:y:2021:i:c:p:661-678

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.09.013

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