Economics at your fingertips  

Injunctive vs. descriptive social norms and reference group dependence

Franziska Heinicke, Christian König-Kersting and Robert Schmidt

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2022, vol. 195, issue C, 199-218

Abstract: We experimentally study role and reference group dependence in the elicitation of injunctive and descriptive social norms. Using mini-dictator games that are designed to reveal distributive motives, we vary whether dictators and recipients either separately or jointly coordinate on social norms. While elicited norms are stable in most constellations, we identify dictators to shift injunctive norms in a direction consistent with self-serving allocation outcomes when coordinating only among themselves. Eliciting beliefs about coordination outcomes shows that participants overestimate the divergences, as they expect them to be prevalent in all treatments and for both roles. Finally, we find descriptive social norms to correlate more strongly with dictator's allocation choices than injunctive norms.

Keywords: Injunctive social norms; Descriptive social norms; Distributive motives; Context dependence; Dictator games; Coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.01.008

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Page updated 2022-07-02
Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:195:y:2022:i:c:p:199-218