Do I care if you are paid? Field experiments and expert forecasts in charitable giving

Holger Rau, Anya Samek and Lilia Zhurakhovska

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2022, vol. 195, issue C, 42-51

Abstract: There is a widespread belief among fundraisers that solicitations by volunteers will be more effective than solicitations by paid workers. In this paper, we confirm this belief through incentivized surveys of fundraising professionals. To explore whether this belief has merit, we conduct a door-to-door fundraising experiment in which solicitors communicate their compensation status to households. In our experiment, we vary (1) whether solicitors are paid or not and (2) the information that potential donors receive about solicitors’ compensation. We find that fundraisers perform equally well in the paid and volunteer conditions when no information about compensation is given to donors. Interestingly, we find that donations are unchanged when donors are informed that solicitors are volunteers. Further, informing donors that solicitors are paid does not decrease donations – in fact, it somewhat increases donations. These results stand in contrast to forecasts of fundraising professionals. A follow-up survey with laypeople suggests that knowing whether a solicitor is paid affects both trust in the charity and perceptions of the solicitor.

Keywords: Charitable giving; Field experiment; Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D12 H41 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:195:y:2022:i:c:p:42-51

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.020

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