 When a coauthor joins an editorial boardLorenzo Ductor and Bauke Visser Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2022, vol. 200, issue C, 576-595 Abstract: Using novel and large-scale data at the individual level, we find that when a coauthor joins an editorial board of an economics journal an author publishes more articles in the “coauthor’s” journal. This increase is larger, the less experienced the author is, and the more editorial power the coauthor obtains. It disappears quickly once the coauthor leaves the journal’s board. A less experienced author whose coauthor joins an editorial board also publishes more in journals different from the coauthor’s journal. We find that the connections-as-signals hypothesis and the identity-independent information hypothesis explain more patterns in the data than the other hypotheses we consider. Only the favoritism hypothesis can explain that, at journals with low board turnover, articles published during a coauthor’s stint on the editorial board receive less citations than articles published during other years. This finding suggests that editors and publishers can address a cause of favoritism by stimulating editorial rotation. JEL-codes: A11 A14 D71 I26 J44 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:200:y:2022:i:c:p:576-595 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.06.014 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D. More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier |
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