 The cost of political uncertainty: Evidence from CataloniaJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2022, vol. 201, issue C, 250-259 Abstract: Nationalist demands for more autonomy or independence create uncertainty. Negotiated agreements over shared legal, administrative and fiscal responsibilities between central and regional authorities are associated with political uncertainty. Unilateral moves towards full independence create deep political uncertainty. We use two empirical methodologies to evaluate the costs of the uncertainty associated with the Catalan-Spanish negotiation for the Catalan Statute and with the demand for independence. 2017 Catalan survey data suggest that entrepreneurs, concerned about the business environment, favored the status quo over independence. Using an event approach methodology, we estimate that the immediate stock market reaction to the approval of the Catalan Statute was negative for (Catalan) firms in the tradable sector. The large political uncertainty due to the 2017 referendum had an even stronger negative stock market effect on all Catalan firms. Our findings are suggestive of costly political uncertainty from quests for more autonomy or independence. Keywords: Autonomy; Independence; Joint administrative responsibility; Event approach methodology (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:201:y:2022:i:c:p:250-259 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.07.024 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D. More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier |
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