Can relief measures nudge compliance in a public health crisis? Evidence from a kinked fiscal policy rule

Claudio Deiana, Andrea Geraci, Gianluca Mazzarella and Fabio Sabatini

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2022, vol. 202, issue C, 407-428

Abstract: We show that compensation measures aimed at improving the fairness of a crisis policy response can unintendedly nudge compliance with emergency rules. We combine information on the distribution of relief funds across Italian municipalities during the novel coronavirus pandemic with data tracking citizens’ movements through mobile devices and navigation systems. To assess the impact of transfers on compliance, we exploit a sharp kink schedule in the allocation of funds. The empirical analysis provides evidence that compliance increased with transfers, suggesting that the observance of emergency rules also depends on the fairness of the pandemic policy response.

Keywords: Compliance; Civic capital; COVID-19 policy response; Stay-at-home orders; Regression kink design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 H30 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Can relief measures nudge compliance in a public health crisis? Evidence from a kinked fiscal policy rule (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:202:y:2022:i:c:p:407-428

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.08.020

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